Can Someone See Your IP Address on a Video Chat?

Short answer: On a video chat that connects devices directly, the other browser receives your public IP address, which points to your internet provider and region, not to your home. A VPN that tunnels all your traffic shows the VPN's address instead, and a relayed connection shows the relay's: on Roulettly, every call is relayed.

Yes, in most cases. On a video chat that connects the two devices directly, the other person's browser receives your public IP address, because that is how the two devices find each other. What that address reveals is limited: roughly your internet provider and your general area, not your street, your name or your home. You can reduce the exposure, but a VPN is not a switch that makes it vanish. On Roulettly, every call goes through an encrypted relay, so the other person only ever sees the relay's address.

Why a video chat needs your IP address at all

Browser video calls use WebRTC. Instead of sending your video up to a server and back down to someone else, WebRTC tries to connect the two devices directly. A direct path means lower delay and fewer machines carrying your stream. It also means each side must tell the other where to send packets.

That information travels as ICE candidates. MDN's guide to WebRTC connectivity describes a candidate as a way the peer can be reached, either directly or through a TURN server. Your browser collects several and the two sides test them until one works. There are three kinds that matter here:

RFC 8445, the ICE specification (2018), lists these types plus a fourth, peer reflexive, learned during the connection tests themselves. It also gives relay candidates the lowest priority: they are used only as a last resort.

The public address in the second row is the one that matters. It has to be shared, because without it nobody outside your router can reach you.

What your IP address reveals, and what it does not

An IP address is assigned to your connection by your provider. Anyone who holds it can look it up in a geolocation database and learn which provider you use and which city or region it is registered to. That is where the information stops.

MaxMind, a major IP geolocation vendor, states on its page about geolocation accuracy that the data is about regions, not residences. It cannot point to your house, and it often misses the right city. It also notes that accuracy varies with the type of connection, and that behind a VPN it may locate the VPN's server rather than you.

So the realistic exposure looks like this:

1. Visible: your public IP address, and from it your provider and an approximate area.
2. Not visible: your postal address, your name, your phone number, your exact position.

The real risk is not the address itself. It is what a person does with it after you have also given them your name, your city and your workplace in conversation. The first minutes of a call are where that happens, not in the network layer.

Can the other person actually see it?

The candidates are exchanged through the site's signalling channel and handed to the page's JavaScript. A normal chat interface never displays them. Someone with browser developer tools, or a modified client, can read them. RFC 8826, the WebRTC security considerations (2021), says it directly: as soon as one side sends its candidates, the other side learns its IP addresses.

You should assume that anyone you connect to directly could read your public IP address if they went looking. Most people will not. Some will.

Your local network is better protected than it used to be. An IETF Internet-Draft on multicast DNS (never finished as an RFC, last revised in December 2021) explains the idea: browsers replace private addresses in host candidates with random .local names, because exposing local addresses to web pages creates a fingerprinting surface. The same document is clear about the limit: public server-reflexive addresses stay exposed, since they are already reachable from the internet.

What WebRTC protects: the content

Hiding your address and protecting your video are two separate questions. WebRTC encrypts media between the two devices. RFC 8826 requires that communicating parties can set up a channel secure against both message recovery and message modification. A relay in the middle forwards encrypted packets and does not hold the keys.

Encryption stops people from reading a stream in transit. It does not stop the person on the other end from seeing it, and it does not hide the address you connect from.

What a VPN changes, and what it does not

A VPN that tunnels all your traffic usually changes the answer: the public address your browser reports becomes the VPN's, so the other person learns the VPN's location instead of yours. That is the useful part.

The limits:

• Partial VPNs. A browser extension or an app that proxies only web traffic may not cover the UDP traffic WebRTC uses. RFC 8828, on WebRTC IP address handling (2021), describes four modes for browsers. Only the strictest one, force proxy, requires media to follow the proxy that carries your web traffic.
• Extra hop. Your video now crosses the VPN provider's servers. You are trusting them with the connection metadata instead of your internet provider.
• Slower calls. An extra hop adds delay, which video notices.
• Nothing about content. A VPN does not change what you say, show or type.

If you use a VPN, check it with a leak test that reports WebRTC addresses before you rely on it. If the page lists your real public address, the tunnel does not cover the call.

Relays: when your address is not shared directly

A TURN server relays media when two devices cannot connect directly. RFC 8656, the TURN specification (2020), explains the privacy side: the remote peer talks to the relayed address on the server, not to yours. The specification even notes that some WebRTC users want location privacy from the remote peer and can choose a relay and send only relayed candidates.

The W3C WebRTC specification (2025) exposes this as a setting, iceTransportPolicy. The value all lets the browser use any candidate type; relay limits it to candidates passing through a TURN server. MDN notes all is the default.

What Roulettly does

Roulettly does not use the default behaviour. Every call goes through an encrypted relay, a TURN server on the service's own server, and the signalling server filters out direct candidates, so the two devices never connect directly. Its how-it-works page describes it in plain words. In the code, the browser is given TURN servers by the service, with short-lived relay credentials.

Two consequences follow:

1. The other person's browser receives the relay's address, never your public IP address.
2. The relay forwards encrypted packets and does not hold the keys, so it can neither read nor store the conversation.

Like any site you open, the service also sees the address your connection comes from. What it does with it is the subject of its terms; read the terms and privacy policy rather than trusting a summary. The conversation is not recorded, and you do not need an account to chat.

How to protect yourself on a video chat

1. Keep personal details out of the conversation. Your address is far less useful to a stranger than your surname and neighbourhood.
2. Use a VPN that covers all traffic if you want the other side to see a different location, and test it for WebRTC leaks.
3. Do not click links or open files a stranger sends during a call.
4. Skip to the next person the moment a conversation turns to your location. The random video chat lets you move on at any time.

FAQ

Can someone find my home address from my IP address?

No. Geolocation data points to an area, not a home. If someone threatens you, report them on the platform and contact the police.

Does a video chat show my IP address to the other person by default?

On a direct connection, their browser receives it as part of the connection setup, even though the interface never shows it. On a relayed connection, they receive the relay's address, which is the case for every call on Roulettly.

Does a VPN make me anonymous on video chat?

No. It can replace the public address the other person sees. It does not hide your face, voice or anything you say, and a partial VPN may leave WebRTC uncovered.

Is my video encrypted?

Yes, WebRTC encrypts media between devices, and a relay forwards it without being able to read it. Encryption does not stop the other person from recording their own screen.

Can I hide my local network address?

Browsers already replace private addresses with random .local names in host candidates, so your home network layout stays out of the picture.

Next step

Decide what you are comfortable with before you connect: a VPN, a short conversation, nothing personal. Then start a free random video chat when you are ready.

Sources

1. IETF, RFC 8445, "Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal", 2018, rfc-editor.org
2. IETF, RFC 8826, "Security Considerations for WebRTC", 2021, rfc-editor.org
3. IETF, RFC 8828, "WebRTC IP Address Handling Requirements", 2021, rfc-editor.org
4. IETF, RFC 8656, "Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN): Relay Extensions to Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", 2020, rfc-editor.org
5. IETF, Internet-Draft draft-ietf-mmusic-mdns-ice-candidates, "Using Multicast DNS to protect privacy when exposing ICE candidates", 2021, datatracker.ietf.org
6. W3C, "WebRTC: Real-Time Communication in Browsers", Recommendation, 2025, w3.org
7. MDN Web Docs, "Connectivity" (WebRTC API guide) and "RTCPeerConnection: RTCPeerConnection() constructor", developer.mozilla.org
8. MaxMind, "IP geolocation accuracy", maxmind.com